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PREPARING COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS
FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:
ANTICIPATING THE LEGAL PROBLEMS
AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
PATRICK J. ROHAN'
This Symposium affords me the unique opportunity to step
back from day-to-day involvement and to draw attention to some
areas of the law that are in need of correction or clarification if
private community associations are to prosper and be free of
Copyright 1999, Patrick J. Rohan. Professor of Law and Dean Emeritus, St.
John's University School of Law.
Editors' Note: Over the past 35 years, Professor Rohan has taught a seminar on
cooperatives, condominiums, and home owner associations ("H.O.A") at St. John's
University School of Law; for 15 of those years he taught the same course at Co-
lumbia Law School. Professor Rohan has also served as legal advisor to various fed-
eral and state agencies active in this field. This public service interlude included a
stint as Executive Director of the New York State Temporary Commission on Rental
Housing, a body charged, inter alia, with modernizing the process whereby apart-
ments that are subject to rent control are converted into condominiums or coopera-
tives. He also gained invaluable experience in his capacity as counsel to institutional
lenders, developers, unit owners and boards of directors of housing entities of all
types. In the process, he represented each of the above-mentioned constituents in
litigation concerning the creation or operation of community associations. On rare
occasions, he has acted as sponsor of the types of projects under discussion. For the
past five years Professor Rohan has gained practical experience with some of the
most successful planned-unit developments in the United States located in Hilton
Head, South Carolina. Accordingly, this article is based on Professor Rohan's pro-
fessional experience in many aspects of this type of housing, complemented by his
academic studies and the treatises he has written or co-authored. See generally
PATRICK J. ROHAN & MELVIN RESKIN, CONDOMINIUM LAW AND PRACTICE (1998);
PATRICK J. ROHAN & MELVIN REsKIN, COOPERATIVE HOusING LAW AND PRACTICE
(1998); PATRICK J. ROHAN, HOME OWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND PLANNED UNIT
DEVELOPMENTS LAW AND PRACTICE (1998). The appendices to these treatises con-
tain a comprehensive bibliography and project forms of every description.
In the interest of full disclosure, Professor Rohan advises the reader that he
participated as counsel or as an expert witness in the following cases cited or dis-
cussed in this article: 817 Fifth Avenue Condominium v. Nixon; Brennan v. Breezy
Point Cooperative; Sherry Associates v. Sherry-Netherland, Inc.; and Collins v. Hay-
den on Hudson Condominium. Professor Rohan also wishes to acknowledge the
major contribution made in the preparation of this article by his research assistants
Nora C. Sheehan, Michael V. Buonaspina, and Erik M. Wallace.
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hidden pitfalls. Among the major conclusions set forth herein
are the following:
1. Practically all new lateral residential developments will
include private roads, recreational facilities, or other amenities
that necessitate employment of a community association of one
type or another. Modern land-use controls, such as cluster-
zoning statutes, as well as emerging fiscal policies of local gov-
ernments, will further accelerate the trend toward home owner
association ("H.O.A.") housing. At the same time, economic
conditions and the landlord's legal exposure will cause the rental
option to all but disappear in every major city. The residential
rental market will wither as buildings are torn down or con-
verted into co-ops or condominiums.
2. The entire law of covenants, whether denominated cove-
nants running with the land or equitable servitudes must be re-
cast to recognize that these devices are no longer the servant of
individual, despotic land owners acting solely for their own per-
sonal gratification or profit. Instead, such covenants now repre-
sent the backbone of community association arrangements of all
types and should be recognized to be as necessary and beneficial
as zoning or other measures passed by local governments.
3. As a general rule, the validity and enforceability of cove-
nants should not vary with the type of parties involved; that is,
judicial treatment should not vary depending upon whether a co-
operative, condominium, or home owner association is seeking to
enforce the covenants. The same may be said of one-on-one suits
involving private parties, although covenants in these cases may
be more prone to abuse and may not evidence as much concern
for the common good.
4. Abuses in the area of discrimination and needless inflic-
tion of emotional and economic injury upon constituent owners
as they attempt to re-sell their units should be remedied by legis-
lation and/or the re-drafting of project documentation.
5. Legislation is needed to remedy prolonged delays in re-
solving loss claims and related abuses on the part of carriers in-
suring these types of projects, especially in light of individual
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participants' inability to control this aspect of their personal
housing situation.
6. Given the projected long life of these housing arrange-
ments, additional consideration must be given to laws that safe-
guard their longevity, notwithstanding the Rule Against Perpe-
tuities" and related rules.
7. Regulation of retirement communities must be strength-
ened substantially, especially where six-figure entrance fees are
exacted (irrespective of whether such fees are theoretically re-
fundable when the participant leaves the project).
8. Many federal, state, and local measures that are designed
to protect the health and welfare of tenants, tradesmen, or the
public at large are being applied helter-skelter to community as-
sociations. This has led to the imposition of stiff civil and/or
criminal penalties upon officers, directors and constituent own-
ers. If left unchecked, this trend will discourage participation by
potential officers and directors. It may also cause counsel for
home buyers to advise their clients to forego community living in
favor of purchasing detached, single-family homes.
Each of these problem areas will be considered in turn.
I. THE AGE OF COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LIVING IS UPON US
Whether one focuses on the housing pattern in large cities or
upon suburbia, one is led inexorably to the conclusion that the
age of community association living, as opposed to renting or
owning a one-family home, is upon us.' The rental market in
every urban center is rapidly disappearing as high-rise buildings
are torn down, devoted to commercial uses, or converted into
See Joseph Conlon, Community Associations Rules Aim to Create Peaceful Liv-
ing, PAC. BUS. NEWS, Jan. 12, 1998, at 32, available in 1998 WL 8850025 (noting
that changes in demographics, the desire for more leisure time, carefree activities,
recreational facilities, and the on-going housing-affordability crisis has resulted in
increased development of community associations); Ellen Paris, Millions Opt for
Community Associations, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1997, at F1, available in 1997 WL
3687492 (estimating that there are 150,000 homeowner and condominium associa-
tions across the country, which is more than seven times the number in 1970, and
projecting that there will be 225,000 community associations by the year 2000).
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condominium or cooperative housing.2 The reasons for this trend
are many and varied. From an income-tax standpoint, the land-
lords' deduction for depreciation shrinks, and ultimately disap-
pears in direct proportion to the number of years they have
owned their premises. The same is true of the mortgage interest
deduction. The loss of this tax shelter for rents has been accom-
panied by sharp increases in the elements that make up operat-
ing costs including fuel, utilities, labor, insurance, and repairs.3
Ever-increasing demands by city administrations for improve-
ments such as the installation of sprinklers and smoke detec-
tors,4 and environmental costs such as removal of lead paint and
asbestos,5 make the future of one's investment in residential real
estate all but speculative, as does the occasional threat of re-
imposition of rent control in buildings not presently subject to
such controls.6 The revolution that has taken place in the law of
2 See Scott E. Mollen, Real Estate Financing Bureau Adapts to a New Market-
place, 220 N.Y. L.J., Oct. 22, 1998, at 1 (projecting that practitioners can expect a
resurgence of conversions of rental housing to condominium or cooperative owner-
ship as a result of seven years of little new construction, widespread decontrol of
rental housing, increased demands for housing in New York City and the recent
Wall Street bull market); Mary A. Mitchell, Cabrini's Mixed Future, CHI. SUN
TIMES, Mar. 6, 1997, at 27, available in 1997 WL 6339708 (describing one ambitious
project to tear down high-rise apartments and construct new multi-family housing
units).
3 See Borough of Little Terry v. Vecchiotti, 7 N.J. Tax 389, 404 (Tax Ct. 1985)
(noting rental increases have failed to keep pace with rapidly-increasing operating
expenses); see also Pamela Dittmer McKuen, In-Depth Look at How Properties Stack
Up, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 16, 1998, at 3, available in 1998 WL 2815201 (stating that the
median total operating cost of cooperatives increased by 12.2 percent per unit per
year in 1995).
4 See B.J. Novitski, New Tools in Fire Protection, ARCHITECTURAL REC., May 1,
1997, at 207 (discussing new housing code requirements such as installation of fire
sprinklers); Brad Bennett, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), Accord Reigns in Del-
ray Fire Sprinkler Dispute, May 5, 1998, at 3B, available in 1998 WL 3262705
(detailing compromises made by city commissions and condominium residents re-
garding installation of smoke detectors and sprinklers).
See Jane Schukoske, The Evolving Paradigm of Laws on Lead-Based Paint:
From Code Violation to Environmental Hazard, 45 S.C. L. REV. 511, 564 (1994)
(discussing the broadening net of people who can be held liable for endangerment
from lead-based paint to include real estate agents and property managers); see also
Elliot H. Levitas & John Vance Hughes, Hazardous Waste Issues in Real Estate
Transactions, 38 MERCER L. REV. 581, 626-41 (1987) (discussing the impact of as-
bestos contamination in real property transactions); Mary Rose Kornreich, Minimiz-
ing Liability for Indoor Air Pollution, 4 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 61, 91 (1990) (discussing a
buyer's enhanced negotiating power to either require a seller to remove asbestos as
a precondition to sale or to reduce the selling price to compensate the buyer for con-
tainment or removal costs).
0 See Joyzelle Davis, Apartment Prices Jump 18 Percent in Santa Monica, 20
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torts, such as implied warranties and liability for the criminal
acts of third parties in certain circumstances, also add to the
landlord's worries.7 Similarly, hardly a month goes by without a
draconian or far-reaching federal, state, or local enactment being
placed as a sword of Damocles over the landlord's head. Among
these are environmental measures8 and discrimination suits.
Accordingly, it is safe to conclude that the trend towards con-
version to condominiums and cooperatives will accelerate and
that the rental housing market in every major city will shrink
and ultimately disappear. Unfortunately, the diminishing rental
market will not be offset by construction of new rental apart-
ments by the private sector; the same economic and legal factors
causing existing landlords to abandon the residential market
will also lead builders to erect non-commercial buildings or new
condominiums and cooperatives.9
This metamorphosis in apartment living finds its parallel in
the lateral housing market of suburbia. Commuters no longer
seek their own detached, one-family homes with an acre of grass
to cut. Instead, they look for a development featuring significant
recreational amenities, i.e., golf course, swimming pool, tennis
courts and clubhouse, maintained by duly elected officers of a
home owner association." Even where these amenities are not
L.A. BUS. J., Jan. 12, 1998, at 1, available in 1998 WL 10249845 (noting that "[r]ent
control laws dampen the desirability of an apartment because a landlord cannot
generate an income stream through rental increases").See, e.g., Burgos v. Aqueduct Realty Corp., 92 N.Y.2d 544 (1998); Price v. New
York City Hous. Auth., 92 N.Y.2d 553 (1998); see also Olin L. Browder, The Taming
of a Duty-The Tort Liability of Landlords, 81 MICH. L. REV. 99 (1982); James L.
Weiss, Comment, Landlord Liability-Obligation to Maintain Adequate Security- A
Comparative Study, 59 TUL. L. REV. 701, 710-11 (1984).
See Davis, supra note 6, at 1 (discussing environmental liabilities).
9 See Lois Weiss, Co-op to Condo Conversion: Saving Glory or Tax Abyss?, 43
REAL EST. WKLY, Feb. 5, 1997, at 1, available in 1997 WL 10025384 (noting the re-
cent trend to convert residential buildings into condominiums); Bob Temliak, Real
Estate Marketplace, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 24, 1998, at SIO (discussing the possible con-
version of New York cooperatives into condominiums as a result of scarcity and in-
creasing demand).
10 See Susan F. French, The Constitution of a Private Residential Government
Should Include a Bill of Rights, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 348 n.15 (1992)
(quoting national statistics: "69% of community associations provide swimming
pools, 46% clubhouses or community rooms, 41% tennis courts, 28% playgrounds,
20% park or natural areas, 17% exercise facilities, 16% lakes, 4% marinas, 4% golf
courses, 4% restaurants"); Wayne S. Hyatt and Jo Anne P. Stubblefield, The Identity
Crisis of Community Associations: In Search of the Appropriate Analogy, 27 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 589, 641 (1993) (pointing out that the development of coop-
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in evidence, other facts of life may make communal living a ne-
cessity. Thus, for example, a builder may avail himself of the
"cluster" housing provision of the local zoning code in order to
maximize the number of buildable units, to avoid problematic
portions of the construction site (such as wet areas or rocky
ledges), or to foster preservation of open space.1 This type of de-
velopment has become increasingly common in recent years.12
The same may be said of the practice of economy-minded local
governments refusing to accept the dedication of roads and sew-
age treatment plants within a project."3 Faced with restrictive
municipal fiscal policies, the developer has little choice but to
create a home owner association to administer the private roads
and other facilities after the builder's departure. 4
Further, an ever-increasing segment of the population is
reaching retirement age." This has created an emerging market
of housing for the elderly, including assisted living and nursing
erative associations was partially due to the desire of individual consumers to own
recreational amenities); Joseph F. Scalo, Timesharing in the '90s, C934 ALI-ABA
435, 439 (1994) (discussing how the timeshare industry has evolved to meet con-
sumer demand for recreational amenities such as golf courses, tennis courts and
marinas).
" Tom Pierce, Note, A Constitutionally Valid Justification for the Enactment of
No-Growth Ordinances: Integrating Concepts of Population Stabilization and Sus-
tainability, 19 U. HAW. L. REV. 93, 144 n.72 (1997) (stating that cluster housing pre-
serves large areas of undeveloped green space).
1" See Neil D. Hamilton, Legal Authority for Federal Acquisition of Conservation
Easements to Provide Agricultural Credit Relief, 35 DRAKE L. REV. 477, 504 n.121
(1985-86) (noting the coming age of cluster housing developments); Boyce
Thompson, Fashion Statement (Changing Styles in Residential Production Architec-
ture), 21 BUILDER 17, Aug. 1, 1998, available in 1998 WL 10806939 (discussing the
evolution of cluster housing).
" See Neighborhood News-Cornwall, HARRISBURG PATRIOT, Aug. 12, 1998, at
B04, available in 1998 WL 6475656 (questioning whether existing roads can ac-
commodate the traffic which cluster housing creates); Jan Barry, Mountainside De-
velopment Denied Waiver, REC. (N. N.J.), Feb. 21, 1998, at A04, available in 1998
WL 5796598 (citing environmental concerns such as traffic and sewage plants that
compelled a New Jersey planning board to vote against a zoning waiver that would
have permitted construction of cluster housing).
14 See, e.g., John W. Fisher, II, The Evolution of Restrictive Covenants in West
Virginia, 100 W. VA. L. REV. 55, 56 (1977) (discussing home owner associations' con-
trol over land use and certain common problems such as road maintenance); Hyatt
& Stubblefield, supra note 10, at 599 (commenting on maintenance responsibilities
of home owner associations).
"' See Neil Shouse, The Bifurcation: Class Polarization and Housing Segrega-
tion in the Twenty-First Century Metropolis, 30 URB. LAW. 145, 171 n.22 (1998)
(noting that the elderly, comprising an increasingly larger share of the population,
are an important component of the zoning reform coalition).
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home facilities.6 These projects frequently take the form of con-
dominiums or home owner associations. The same is true of
publicly-sponsored shelters for low and middle-income groups. 8
In short, the age of detached, single-family homes and rental
apartments is fast drawing to a close and is being replaced by
community association living in one form or another. 9
16 See Joel C. Dobris, Medicaid Asset Planning by the Elderly: A Policy View of
Expectations, Entitlement and Inheritance, 24 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 1 (1989)
(acknowledging the growing rental housing market for the elderly); Ralph Michael
Stein, Book Review, 18 REAL EST. L.J. 112 (1989) (reviewing ARTHUR E. GIMMY &
MICHAEL G. BOEHM, ELDERLY HOUSING: A GUIDE TO APPRAISAL, MARKET ANALYSIS,
DEVELOPMENT AND FINANCING (1988)); Eric Avidon, Seniors Housing Called Likely
to Attract Investors, NATL MORTGAGE NEWS, Sept. 1, 1997, available in 1997 WL
12863077 (commenting that investors will increasingly finding senior housing an
attractive option over the next 10 years).
'7 It is fashionable to equate "gated communities" with disdain for one's fellow
man. In fact, the elderly are drawn to such projects, both for their amenities and for
the feeling of safety engendered by the monitoring of visitors and night ground pa-
trol by association personnel.
,' See Judith Bernstein-Baker, Cooperative Conversion: Is it Only for the
Wealthy? Proposals that Promote Affordable Cooperative Housing in Philadelphia,
61 TEMP. L. REV. 393 (1988) (commenting that cooperative housing will increasingly
become a form of housing for low and middle-income families who require shelter);
see also Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Displacement and Urban Reinvestment: A Mount Lau-
rel Perspective, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 333 (1984) (discussing innovative anti-
displacement activities in American cities, including the purchase of condominium
units for low and middle-income families whose apartments are being converted).
'9 It is difficult to gauge the exact number of condominiums, cooperatives, and
home owner associations in the United States and how many people reside therein.
However, some approximation of the numbers can be made. As early as 1986, the
Supreme Court of California, in surveying the housing market of a single state, ob-
served:
We... take judicial notice of the fact that a rapidly growing share of Cali-
fornia's population reside in condominiums, cooperatives and other types of
common-interest housing projects. Homeowner associations manage the
housing for an estimated 15 percent of the American population and, for
example, as much as 70 percent of the new housing built in Los Angeles
and San Diego Counties. Nationally, "[tihey are growing at a rate of 5,000
a year and represent more than 50 percent of new construction sales in the
urban areas. Projects average about 100 units each, so the associations af-
fect some 10 million owners," according to C. James Dowden, executive vice
president of the Community Association Institute in Alexandria, Vir-
ginia.... [HIousing experts estimate that there already are 15,000 com-
mon-interest housing associations in California. While in some projects the
maintenance of common areas is truly cooperative, in most of the larger
projects control of the common area is delegated or controlled by ruling
bodies that do not exercise the members' collective will on a one-person,
one-vote basis.
Frances T. v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 723 P.2d 573, 578 n.9 (Cal. 1986) (in
bank) (citations omitted) (quoting Mike Bowler & Evan McKenzie, Invisible King-
1999]
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H. THE LAW OF COVENANTS AND RESTRICTIONS MUST BE RECAST
TO REFLECT THE HOUSING METAMORPHOSIS OUTLINED ABOVE.
Unlike other areas of private-sector law, real property law
has never been extensively reviewed or modernized." The Great
Depression, the Second World War, and the emergence of a uni-
fied national economy led to monumental changes in the law of
contracts,2' employment law,' child welfare,2 and taxation.'
doms, CAL. LAW., Dec. 1985, at 54, 56).
More recently, the non-profit trade organization Community Associations Insti-
tute ("C.A.I.") estimated that 40 million Americans currently reside in some form of
community association project. The C.A.I. estimates that the number of such asso-
ciations has grown from approximately 10,000 in 1970 to 205,000 at the present
time. The C.A.I. further projects that 6,000 to 8,000 new associations are being
formed each year. The approximate breakdown by type is estimated as follows:
home-owners' associations, 64 percent; condominiums, 31 percent; and cooperatives,
5 percent. See Steven Siegel, The Constitution and Private Government: Toward the
Recognition of Constitutional Rights in Private Residential Communities Fifty Years
After Marsh v. Alabama, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 461 (1998).
A recent Wall Street Journal article discussed statistics released by the Ameri-
can Seniors Housing Association that reported that the number of senior citizen
projects has risen from 1,500 a decade ago to 2,700 facilities today. See Michael
Moss, Home Sweet... For Retirees-Moving Into "Continuing Care" Offers No
Guarantees, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 1998, at Al. In some jurisdictions, so-called
"Master Planned Communities" have been built on a massive scale. The top-ten Ac-
tive Master-Planned Communities, by size in acres, line up in the following order:
Irving Ranch, Orange County, Calif. 110,000
Poinciana, Poinciana, Fla. 47,000
Woodlands, Houston 25,000
Summerlin, Las Vegas 22,500
Highlands Ranch, Denver 22,000
Kingwood, Houston 14,000
Mission Viejo, Orange Co., Calif. 10,325
Sienna Plantation, Houston 10,000
Clear Lake City, Houston 10,000
First Colony, Houston 9,700
Neal Templin, The Lure of Planned Suburbs: No Yard Sales, Just 2 Pets, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 7, 1998, at B1.
20 See Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 317 A.2d 68, 74 (N.J. 1974) (noting that the law
has progressed more slowly in the real property field than in other fields); Vincent
DiLorenzo, Restraints on Alienation in a Condominium Context: An Evaluation and
Theory for Decision Making, 24 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 403 (1989) (analyzing the
policy basis for property law doctrine prohibiting restraints on alienation and the
need for changes); see also Susan F. French, Servitudes Reform and the New Re-
statement of Property: Creation Doctrines and Structural Simplification, 73
CORNELL L. REV. 928, 928 (1988) (describing the law governing servitudes as the
most "archaic body of American property law remaining in the twentieth century").
21 See generally P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
(1979) (discussing the changes that have occurred in contract law regarding assent,
choice, and reliance based on liabilities); 1 JOSEPH CHITTY, CHITTY ON CONTRACTS
8-9 (27th ed. 1994) (noting that statutory regulation of contracts has altered tradi-
[73:3
PREPARING COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS
Banking and commerce have been overhauled, not only by con-
gressional measures but also by the advent of state legislation,
such as the Uniform Commercial Code.' Even the field of crimi-
nal law has been completely changed in the past fifty years,26 as
has the lofty subject of constitutional law.27 By contrast, few
sweeping changes of any significance have occurred in the field
of real property.2 Nowhere is this fact of life more evident than
in the area of covenants and restrictions. They continue to be
regarded with disfavor as isolated attempts by inept or mean-
spirited grantors to interfere with the right of every person to
enjoy their property to the absolute fullest.2 9 Admittedly, some
tional contract law).
2 See LOUIS WEINER, FEDERAL WAGE AND HOUR LAW ix (1977) (noting that
amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-213 (1994),
prompted much litigation and change in the field of labor and employment law); see
also Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946) (holding that em-
ployers must compensate their employees for time spent in pre and post-shift ac-
tivities if such activities are pre-requisites to principal work activities); Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 838 F.2d 1411 (5th Cir. 1988) (deciding that
there is no constitutional bar to applying the Fair Labor Standards Act to state and
local government employment).
2 See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAw § 409 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1998)
(concerning provisional services for children); id. § 411 (providing protective services
for abused and maltreated children); see also Mychal L. Feldman, Note, The Child
Welfare System and Its Implications on the Best Interests of Children, 14 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. HUI. RTS. 615, 623 (1998) (noting that New York has established more pro-
ductive child welfare laws and agencies).
24 See I.R.C. § 7441 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998) (codifying the Tax Reform Act of
1969 and establishing the tax court).
2 See, e.g., Larry T. Garvin, Adequate Assurance of Performance: of Risk, Du-
ress, and Cognition, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 71, 71-72 (1998) (noting that with the
U.C.C., Karl Llewellyn changed contract law by including the doctrine of adequate
assurances).
26 See, e.g., Brogan v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 805, 812 (1998) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (recalling the congressional legislation of 1981 that was intended to re-
vise and recodify federal criminal law); Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10
(1980) (detailing the evolution of the criminal law regarding principals and accesso-
ries).
27 See Agostini v. Felton, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 2016 (1997) (noting that there has been
a significant change in the development of our constitutional law). See generally
Raymond B. Marcin, Natural Law, Homosexual Conduct, and the Public Policy Ex-
ception, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 67, 81 (1998) (noting that constitutional law is a con-
stantly changing and evolving doctrine).
28 Curiously, the largest single innovation in the real property area in the past
half-century has been the advent of condominium legislation nationwide in the early
1960s. This development, in turn, reinvigorated the home owner association as a
viable housing vehicle.
See Ridgely Condominium Ass'n v. Smyrnioudis, 660 A.2d 942 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1995) (noting that covenants that are proven to be wholly arbitrary or in viola-
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individuals do draft covenants running with the land that fly in
the face of common sense and run contrary to public policy, such
as covenants that discriminate along racial" or religious lines,31
or that enable the grantor to repurchase the premises at a re-
mote future date for the same price he or she received in selling
the property today.32 While such covenants originating in one-
on-one situations may have been typical in the past, their quan-
titative importance is negligible in today's market in light of the
widespread use of covenants in condominium, cooperative, and
home-owner association arrangements. 3  Nevertheless, the tail
tion of public policy will be invalidated); see also 9 RIcHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON
REAL PROPERTY 673 (Patrick J. Rohan ed. 1998) (noting that the policy favoring
unfettered use of land helps to avoid overbroad restrictions which enlarge the class
of persons excluded from using the land); French, supra note 20, at 928 (opining
that the complexity of servitudes law is the result of judicial perception that the un-
restrained enforcement of servitudes is dangerous).
30 See Mayers v. Ridley, 465 F.2d 630, 631 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (noting that it is un-
lawful to include discriminatory covenants which indicate a preference based on
race in documents for conveyance of property); Broadmoor San Clemente Home-
owners Ass'n v. Nelson, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 316, 318 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that
discrimination against group homes via restrictive covenants is unlawful).
31 See Southside Fair Hous. Comm. v. City of New York, 928 F.2d 1336, 1351 (2d
Cir. 1991) (noting that government entanglement with religious affairs is not fos-
tered by restrictive covenants forbidding discrimination contained in land transfers
between religious communities and governments).
32 See, e.g., D-F Fund VIII, L.L.C. v. Resolution Trust Co., No. CA 3-96 CV-3367-
R, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 1998); Low v. Spellman, 629
A.2d 57 (Me. 1993); Syman v. Vanderheuval, 672 N.Y.S.2d 454 (App. Div. 1998).
33 This is not to say that there are no longer any grantors who might impose re-
strictive covenants originating with strongly-held personal preferences or view-
points. Many Southerners still refer to the Civil War as "the recent unpleasant-
ness." As recently reported in the Charleston Gazette, one Southerner went a step
further. See Bruce Smith, Plantation Owner Bars All "Yankees," CHARLESTON
GAZETTE, Feb. 7, 1998, at P4C, available in 1998 WL 5932297. Henry Ingram, Jr.
attracted national attention by recording covenants running with the land that, in
terms, prohibit "Yankees" from owning or occupying any portion of a 1,688 acre of
tract of South Carolina farm land. See id. His effort to stave off the migration of
union sympathizers to the South was described as follows:
More than a century after Gen. William T. Sherman's troops burned every
building on the property, Henry Ingram Jr. has vowed never to let his
plantation fall into Yankee hands again.
Ingram went down to the courthouse Wednesday and filed deed restric-
tions barring the sale of the land to anyone from north of the Mason-Dixon
Line and anyone named Sherman.
Ingram did not return phone calls to his home on Friday, but he told The
Beaufort Gazette: "This is the prettiest piece of land in the county, and I
want to keep it that way. I want to make sure that no one has access to it
that I don't want to be there."
The deed restrictions he filed at the Jasper County courthouse prohibit
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the "Yankee race"-those who were born above the Mason-Dixon line or
who have lived there for a year or more-from owning any part of the 1,688
acres.
Also, anyone named Sherman can't even set foot on the property. In fact,
Northerners who aren't named Sherman but whose names can be spelled
from its letters had better stay out too.
The property, mostly wetlands and tall pines, is five miles north of Sa-
vannah, Ga. Ingram said he wants to put a motel, a convenience store and
restaurant there, along with homes for himself and family members.
South Carolina banker Langdon Cheves established the plantation in
1829 and it quickly became one of the largest rice operations in the area. It
was destroyed in January 1865 as Sherman's troops crossed the Savannah
River into South Carolina.
Ingram, who owns several video gambling parlors in the area, bought the
property last month for $1.2 million. He lives on Hilton Head Island, a lux-
ury resort area popular with Yankees.
"Slowly but surely they have taken over Hilton Head, they've taken over
Beaufort County. They're infiltrating Jasper County," Ingram told the Sa-
vannah (Ga.) Morning News. "They're worse than fire ants."
Ingram said he and his son came up with the language and had a lawyer
review it.
Bill McEleveen, a Columbia real estate attorney, chuckled when told of
the restrictions but said they might stand up. "I'd hate to be judge, though.
I don't think you can win with this one," he said.
Federal laws prevent discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion,
handicap, marital status or national origin, but say nothing about geogra-
phy within the United States.
Id.
Ingram's anti-Northerners campaign even attracted the attention of the Associ-
ated Press and the American Bar Association. See, e.g., Yankee-Stay Home! South-
ern Hospitality on Hold, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1998, at 14. Mr. Ingram has retained the
right to grant exceptions, on a case-by-case basis, for selected Northerners who take
a redeeming "Southern Oath," that makes them into "naturalized Southerners."
Both the recorded covenants and "Southern Oath7 are reprinted in the Appen-
dix of this article. They were furnished to the writer as a result of a telephone call
made to Mr. Ingram in South Carolina. He kindly acceded to my republishing them
in the St. John's Law Review. However, he might have had second thoughts about
the matter if he had known that my wife is the great, great-granddaughter of Gen-
eral William Tecumseh Sherman.
The ultimate irony in this case may lie in the fact that if the law of South Caro-
lina on this subject is the same as that of some other states, the covenants will not
be permitted to run with the land because the creator thereof reserved the right to
unilaterally release them with respect to any restricted parcels he chooses.
Regarding whether reservation of the right to forgive C & R's makes them ipso
facto personal to the developer, see Finchum v. Vogel, 194 So. 2d 49 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1966) and Carranor Woods Property Owners' Ass'n v. Driscoll, 153 N.E.2d 681
(Ohio 1957). But see Hall v. Gulledge, 145 So. 2d 794 (Ala. 1962); Kreppel v. Tucker,
225 N.Y.S.2d 708 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Goldberg v. Paul, 178 N.Y.S.2d 349 (Sup. Ct.
1958); East Sevier County Util. Dist. v. Wachavia Bank & Trust Co, 570 S.W.2d 850
(Tenn. 1978). See generally Uriel Reichman, Residential Private Governments: An
Introductory Private Survey, 43 U. CmI. L. REV. 253, 292 (1976); Maurice T. Brun-
ner, Annotation, Who May Enforce Restrictive Covenant or Agreement as to Use of
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continues to wag the dog, as well-meaning judges reiterate the
centuries-old proposition that covenants are not favored in the
law and should be narrowly construed (if not read out of exis-
tence) wherever possible.' However, in the last half of the
twentieth century, covenants and restrictions have evolved from
a reflection of the peculiar predilections of one grantor into the
lofty status of finely-tuned private zoning measures that make
community living possible. 5 Accordingly, like zoning ordinances,
they should be looked upon favorably (if not benignly) in the ab-
stract, and enforced whenever reasonably possible. 6 In fact,
home owner associations are often referred to as "protective as-
sociations" and "private government[s]" in recognition of this
truism.3 7 Are you not better off with recorded covenants that re-
quire your neighbor to park his ice cream truck at his place of
business instead of his driveway, and to park his boat in his ga-
rage or rear yard? In short, the time has come to bring the law
of covenants abreast of the beneficial function these devices ac-
tually serve and their all-but-universal presence in modern
housing arrangements."
Real Property, 51 A-L.R.3D 556 (1973 & Supp. 1998).
4 See e.g., Eagle Enters., Inc. v. Gross, 349 N.E.2d 816, 818 (N.Y. 1976). See
generally 9 POWELL, supra note 29, §§ 60.01-.11.
3 See Casey J. Little, Riss v. Angeh Washington Remodels the Framework for
Interpreting Restrictive Covenants, 73 WASH. L. REV. 433, 440 (1998) (noting that
since zoning laws already limit the use of property, additional restraints that re-
strictive covenants impose on land may be viewed as a means of efficiently allocat-
ing resources using private agreements).
36 See 1 PATRICK J. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS §§ 1.01-.05 (1998).
37 EVAN MCKENZIE, PRWVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF
RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOvERNMENT 140 (1994).
38 Of course, this generalization must be modified to fit special circumstances.
In a high-rise cooperative apartment building, for example, the co-op board of direc-
tors must be accorded greater control over such factors as noise and anti-social be-
havior than might be accorded the board of a lateral condominium or H.O.A. Simi-
larly, because there is one mortgage and one real estate tax levy on the entire co-op
building, making the cooperators financially interdependent to a greater degree
than exists in the condominium and H.O.A. situations, the co-op should be accorded
more leeway in rejecting a prospective purchaser on re-sale for financial reasons.
Nevertheless, as a general proposition, covenants involving any of the recognized
forms of community associations should be benignly construed and accorded uni-
form treatment. To a great extent, the same approach should be taken with respect
to covenants that do not involve community associations, i.e. one-on-one situations.
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III. RECORDED COVENANTS SHOULD BE CONSTRUED AND
ENFORCED UNIFORMLY, IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER THEY
INVOLVE CONDOMINIUM, COOPERATIVE OR H.O.A.
ARRANGEMENTS, OR ONE-ON-ONE SITUATIONS.
The change in attitude toward covenants advocated above
should be made across the board, i.e., their validity and interpre-
tation should be treated the same, irrespective of whether the
covenants appear in a condominium, cooperative or H.O.A. case,
or in a suit between two private individuals. In this regard, Ea-
gle Enterprises, Inc. v. Gross,9 decided by the New York Court of
Appeals in 1976, is instructive. A developer of rural land re-
corded a covenant running with the land." The covenant obli-
gated his lot purchasers to pay thirty-five dollars annually to de-
fray the developer's cost in creating a well to supply water to the
participants during the six-month season when the parcels in
question were most likely to be utilized.4 After having acceded
to this arrangement for some time, a recalcitrant owner winter-
ized his cabin, installed a year-round well and refused to pay the
developer the agreed-upon sum per annum.42 The court reviewed
the case under the age-old rules governing covenants to pay
money and concluded that the promise could not run with the
land.' The court also cavalierly assumed that the financial bur-
39 349 N.E.2d 816 (N.Y. 1976).
40 See id. at 817.
4' See id
42See id- at 818.
A unanimous Court of Appeals rendered an opinion containing the following
statement:
A close examination of the covenant in the case before us leads to the con-
clusion that it does not substantially affect the ownership interest of land-
owners in the Orchard Hill subdivision. The covenant provides for the
supplying of water for only six months of the year; no claim has been ad-
vanced by appellant that the lands in the subdivision would be waterless
without the water it supplies. Indeed, the facts here point to the converse
conclusion since respondent has obtained his own source of water. The rec-
ord, based on and consisting of an agreed stipulation of facts, does not
demonstrate that other property owners in the subdivision would be de-
prived of water from appellant or that the price of water would become
prohibitive for other property owners if respondent terminated appellant's
service. Thus, the agreement for the seasonal supply of water does not
seem to us to relate in any significant degree to the ownership rights of re-
spondent and the other property owners in the subdivision of Orchard Hill.
The landowners in Neponsit received an easement in common to utilize
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den shifted onto the shoulders of the developer and/or other par-
ticipating owners was negligible.44 If the assumption was cor-
rect, the burden the complainant agreed to shoulder would also
be negligible. Moreover, if this were a condominium arrange-
ment, the statute would prevent participants from absolving
themselves of the responsibility of paying their full share by ab-
staining from making use of shared facilities or services.45 If the
public areas in the subdivision; this interest was in the nature of a prop-
erty right attached to their respective properties. The obligation to receive
water from appellant resembles a personal, contractual promise to pur-
chase water rather than a significant interest attaching to respondent's
property. It should be emphasized that the question whether a covenant is
so closely related to the use of the land that it should be deemed to "run"
with the land is one of degree, dependent on the particular circumstances
of a case. Here, the meager record before us is lacking and woefully insuf-
ficient to establish that the covenant "touches and concerns" the land, as
we have interpreted that requirement.
Id. at 819-20 (citing Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Say. Bank, 15
N.E.2d 793, 796 (N.Y. 1938).
This passage is difficult to reconcile with the reality of real estate fundamen-
tals. Anyone about to acquire a lot for development, other than property serviced
fully by a municipality, must have three factors in mind: (1) Is there an all-weather
access road; (2) Is there access to electrical service; and (3) Is there a reliable source
of water?
Here, the seasonally-occupied property was being serviced by a reliable well for
the modest sum of $35 per year (or less than $3 per month). Nevertheless, the court
found the burden too great and lasting too long. The property purchaser is usually
hoping his source of water will be there forever.
" See id. at 819 (stating the record did not show "that the price of water would
become prohibitive for other property owners if respondent terminated appellant's
service").
45 See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-x (McKinney 1989) ("No unit owner may ex-
empt himself from liability for his common charges by waiver of the use or enjoy-
ment of any of the common elements or by abandonment of his unit."). Section 339-x
frequently costs the developer tens of thousands of dollars once the condominium
plan is declared effective, insofar as the builder must pay the full common charges
on the unsold units (including unbuilt units), on a monthly basis, and cannot de-
mand a common charge forgiveness or step-down rate on such units. If the recalci-
trant owner in the Eagle Enterprises case had resided in a condominium project that
only opened its swimming pool six months of the year, such owner could not build
his own year-round pool and expect to reduce his common charges thereby. The
same would be true if the condominium only supplied water six months of the year.
The unit owner could not expect a stepped-down common charge if he sunk his own
well.
The court in Eagle Enterprises also waxed enthusiastic over the heat supply
covenant in Nicholson v. 300 Broadway Realty Corp., 164 N.E.2d 832 (N.Y. 1959),
noting that the covenant would die a natural death when either house was de-
stroyed. See Eagle Enterprises, Inc., 349 N.E.2d at 820 (stating that the covenant
"was conditioned upon -the continued existence of the buildings"). However, the
benefited owner would likely retrofit his house to make sure it survived all perils
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covenant would be valid in the condominium context, there is no
reason to deem it nefarious and unenforceable in a parallel one-
on-one context. Rather, it makes more sense to adopt the mod-
ern, liberal approach found in condominium legislation, instead
of adhering to the outmoded common law disdain for covenants
as an anti-social and an unwarranted interference with one's
right to do as one pleases.46
and could sue his neighbor if his burdened property were allowed to go to rack and
ruin. Therefore, in this writer's view, the Nicholson covenant should have been
modified or struck down by the courts, and the Eagle Enterprises covenant should
have been sustained.
4" Thus, for example, the New York Courts have customarily been viewed as
progressive in the area of covenants and restrictions ever since Neponsit was de-
cided. Yet in Eagle Enterprises, the New York Court of Appeals stated:
There is an additional reason why we are reluctant to enforce this cove-
nant for the seasonal supply of water. The affirmative covenant is disfa-
vored in the law because of the fear that this type of obligation imposes an
"undue restriction on alienation or an onerous burden in perpetuity[.]" In
Nicholson, the covenant to supply heat was not interdicted by this concern
because it was conditioned upon the continued existence of the buildings on
both the promisor's and the promisee's properties. Similarly, in Neponsit,
the original 1917 deed containing the covenant to pay an annual charge for
the maintenance of public areas expressly provided for its own lapse in
1940. Here, no outside limitation has been placed on the obligation to pur-
chase water from appellant. Thus, the covenant falls prey to the criticism
that it creates a burden in perpetuity, and purports to bind all future own-
ers, regardless of the use to which the land is put. Such a result militates
strongly against its enforcement. On this ground also, we are of the opinion
that the covenant should not be enforced as an exception to the general
rule prohibiting the "running" of affirmative covenants.
Eagle Enterprises, Inc., 349 N.E.2d at 820 (quotingNicholson, 164 N.E.2d at 835).
This rationale is all the more surprising considering that the New York Court
of Appeals routinely enforces expired covenants and restrictions which provide for
the collection of maintenance assessments on the theory that the recalcitrant prop-
erty owner is liable in quasi contract or a contract implied-in-fact for buying into a
community that supplied services and facilities on a pay-as-you-go basis. See Patrick
J. Rohan & John P. Healy, Home Owner Association Assessment Litigation In New
York-An Overview 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 199, 208 n.24 (1999) (citing cases). The
court's opinion in Eagle Enterprises also ignores the fact that enforcement of cove-
nants is usually done by way of an injunction, a peculiarly equitable remedy that is
not granted where to do so would work an injustice.
Similarly, the "change of neighborhood" doctrine is also available to enable the
court to eliminate truly outmoded covenants. See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. §§ 1950-55
(McKinney 1979 & Supp. 1999).
No restriction on the use of land created at any time by covenant, promise
or negative easement... [shall] be declared or determined to be enforceable
if, at the time the enforceability of the restriction is brought in question, it
appears that the restriction is of no actual and substantial benefit to the
persons seeking its enforcement... either because the purpose of the re-
striction has already been accomplished or, by reason of changed condi-
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IV. THE CONTROL OF COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS OVER RE-SALES
AND THE LEASING OF ONE'S UNIT SHOULD BE MORE CLOSELY
MONITORED TO PREVENT FINANCIAL HARDSHIP
The modern approach to control of re-sales by constituent
unit owners is found in condominium statutes wherein the board
of managers has a thirty-day option to match the offer the seller
has received from a third party. 7 This mechanism usually ac-
complishes substantial justice for all concerned for two reasons.
First, the match-offer option is seldom exercised by the board of
managers because they generally do not have reserve funds to
pay for the acquisition, and, even if they did, they would prefer
not to spend it this way. Second, if there is a serious problem,
financial or otherwise, with a prospective purchaser obtained by
the seller, the latter can usually be induced to find a replacement
buyer."' A particular problem occurs in states like New York
tions or other cause, its purpose is not capable of accomplishment ....
Id. § 1951(1); see also N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 345(a). Of course, not all commenta-
tors agree with the enlightened views expressed in this article. For a survey of
opinions on the social value of covenants running with the land, see Morrison v.
Piper, 566 N.E.2d 643 (N.Y. 1990); Cohen v. Olmstead Condominium, No. 22302634
(Sup. Ct. Oct. 15, 1998); Stewart E. Sterk, Minority Protection in Residential Private
Governments, 77 B.U. L. REV. 273 (1997) (suggesting a model for protection of the
minority interest in community associations based in part on limits imposed by cor-
porate law on majoritarian actions); Stewart E. Sterk, Freedom From Freedom of
Contract: The Enduring Value of Servitude Restrictions, 70 IOWA L. REV. 615 (1985)
(suggesting that common-law restrictions on freedom of contract can remedy prob-
lems of inefficiency and unfairness in the current system of negotiating the removal
of servitudes); James L. Winokur, The Mixed Blessings of Promissory Servitudes:
Toward Optimizing Economic Utility, Individual Liberty, and Personal Identity,
1989 WIS. L. REV. 1 (1989) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of modern
promissory servitudes and suggesting possible reforms to limit the effects of servi-
tudes on individual liberty); Timothy C. Shepard, Comment, Termination of Servi-
tudes: Expanding the Remedies for "Changed Conditions," 31 UCLA L. REV. 226, 228
(1983) (proposing "the use of both equitable remedies and damage awards in cases
where circumstances have rendered covenants and servitudes unfairly burden-
some").
4 See Condominium Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 1964, ch. 82, § 2 (codified as N.Y.
REAL PROP. LAW art. 9-B (McKinney 1989)); Walter D. Goldsmith, Practice Com-
mentaries to N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW art. 9-B at 582-85 (McKinney 1989) (citing Smith
v. Smith, 497 N.Y.S.2d 192 (App. Div. 1986); Buffalo Seminary v. McCarthy, 451
N.Y.S.2d 457 (App. Div. 1982), affd, 447 N.E.2d 76 (N.Y. 1983); 100-25 Queens
Boulevard Tenant Ass'n v. Abrams, N.Y. L.J., May 18, 1988, at 12 (Sup. Ct. May 17,
1988); Anderson v. 50 E. 72nd St. Condominium, 492 N.Y.S.2d 989 (Sup. Ct. 1985),
affd, 505 N.Y.S.2d 101 (App. Div. 1986); Metropolitan Transp. Auth. v. Bruken Re-
alty Corp., 479 N.Y.S.2d 646 (Sup. Ct. 1984), affd, 492 N.Y.S.2d 508 (App. Div.
1985), affd, 492 N.E.2d 379 (N.Y. 1986)).
48The writer has only observed a condominium board exercising its match offer
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that, on re-sale, permit a co-op's board of directors to turn down
prospective purchasers for no reason or for any reason other
than race, creed, color, religion or other constitutionally-
prohibited basis.49 Even if the board acts in good faith, its ability
to exercise broad discretion places the entire financial and social
burden back on the outgoing unit owner, who, upon having his
proffered buyer rejected, must now start the process of seeking
an acceptable purchaser all over again. In recent years, this has
worked an extreme hardship on unit sellers relocated to another
city by their employers or whose units have become substantially
devalued as a consequence of radical downturns in the co-op
market." This evil is compounded by the fact that in most co-ops
the cooperator has no right, or a very limited right, to lease out
his unit to enable him to carry the unit pending its resale."' This
right in the following two situations: (1) Where the board wanted an apartment so it
could have a live-in superintendent on the premises; and (2) Where the unit was
being offered for sale at a rock bottom price. In the latter case, the board would pur-
chase the unit and immediately resell it at its true market value. The profit made
on the re-sale would then be added to the condominium's reserve fund.
'9 See Weisner v. 791 Park Ave. Corp., 160 N.E.2d 720, 724 (N.Y. 1959) (finding
that "[aibsent the application of [anti-discrimination statutes] ... there is no reason
why the owners of the co-operative apartment house could not decide for themselves
with whom they wish to share their elevators, their common halls and facilities,
their stockholders' meetings, their management problems and responsibilities and
their homes").
r' The problem also crops up where a cooperator buys a second apartment in the
building for an elderly parent who later passes away. If the second apartment can-
not be resold quickly, and the cooperator cannot sublet it, a prolonged period of eco-
nomic hardship may result because the cooperator must now pay maintenance
charges on the second residential unit that they can neither sell nor rent out. It is
ironic that, in a building that is not a cooperative, an ordinary tenant has greater
protection because he can propose a reasonable, solvent assignee or sublessee to the
landlord and is freed from the lease if the landlord refuses to accept such a subles-
see. See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 226-b (McKinney 1989). Thus, while the landlord
has no duty to mitigate damages, he has a duty to act reasonably in enabling the
ordinary tenant to mitigate his own damages. A cooperator, with a greater invest-
ment in his building, should receive similar consideration and be permitted to sublet
when market conditions make ready re-sale difficult or impossible.
6' See Thompson v. 490 W. End Apartments Corp., 676 N.Y.S.2d 73 (App. Div.
1998) (denying apartment owner a declaration allowing her to sublease the apart-
ment without the board's consent where the proprietary lease excepted only holders
of unpurchased shares from approval requirement); Yochim v. McGrath, 626
N.Y.S.2d 685 (Yonkers City Ct. 1995) (holding apartment owner liable to subtenant
for constructive eviction when owner rented apartment without prior approval of
the co-op board and the board threatened the subtenant with actual eviction);
McVann v. Myers, 497 N.Y.S.2d 819, 823 (Yonkers City Ct. 1985) (holding that
"[t]he proprietary lessee does not enjoy absolute ownership and control over the
unit" and "can be evicted... for failure to meet... [the] obligations" of the lease
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double blow to departing unit owners plays havoc with their fi-
nances and may impair their credit rating or even push them
into insolvency." This problem should be addressed by the legis-
lature via a measure that only gives the board a right to match
the offer the unit seller has received from a third party, or re-
stricts the board's right to turn down a buyer to cases wherein
such rejection is "reasonable." Legislative relief might go further
and provide for the leasing of one's unit if its immediate sale is




52 The maintenance of a "wait list" for apartments as suggested in the text, infra
Part IV(A), would help alleviate this situation in normal economic times. This as-
sumes, of course, that the list is not kept as a means of engaging in a subtle form of
discrimination.
5 An excellent piece of legislation along these lines was passed by the New
legislature in 1998. An addition to Chapter 8 of Title 46 of the New Jersey Revised
Statutes stipulates as follows:
1. a. The Legislature finds and declares that it is in the public interest of
the citizens of this State that the availability of rental housing be encour-
aged. Therefore restrictions imposed by certain cooperative agreements
which unreasonably inhibit or prevent the holder of a proprietary lease to a
cooperative unit form making the unit available for rental shall be contrary
to the public policy of the State of New Jersey and shall be unenforceable.
b. Subsection a. of this section shall not apply to: any cooperative in which
requirements limiting occupancy to holders of proprietary leases to units
were established at the time that the cooperative was created, and which
requirements were emphasized in the offering document as an absolute
condition of ownership, and have been consistently and strictly enforced
since that time, or which requirements were established upon the transfer
of control of the association board from the developer to the holders of pro-
prietary leases to units through properly amended bylaws which have been
consistently and strictly enforced since the time of amendment.
c. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, in those coop-
eratives which meet the criteria of subsection b. and in which more than
ten units are under one roof, when a unit is offered for sale at or below a
sales price such that a sale will result in a return of any investment only,
and the unit nevertheless remains unsold for four or more months, then
the owner shall have the right, subject to the conditions in subsection d. of
this section, to rent the unit for such a period of time until prevailing mar-
ket conditions permit a sale which will allow recoupment of the investment
in the unit. For the purposes of this subsection, investment shall include
the purchase price, costs related to the acquisition of the property, and the
costs of any improvements made to the property.
d. Nothing in this act shall prohibit a cooperative association from
adopting reasonable rules necessary to protect the health, safety or inter-
est of all of the owners, including rules based on lending policies of finan-
cial institutions pertaining to owner-occupancy ratios or from requiring a
reasonable minimum term of leasehold, nor shall such associations be
PREPARING COMMUNITYASSOCIATIONS
A. The "Wait List" Alternative
It may prove advisable for the board of a condominium, co-
operative or home owner association to maintain a wait list of
"pre-approved" prospects for a unit in the project. This, coupled
with a requirement that a prospective unit seller give the board
thirty days advance notice of acceptable terms, may solve the
problem because the board could give the seller ready access to a
prohibited from requiring that al [sic] tenants comply with the properly
adopted rules of the association which are applicable to other unit owners,
including, but not limited to, rules relating to such matters as parking,
pets, noise, and the number of permitted occupants per unit. A cooperative
association which elects to screen tenants shall interview prospective ten-
ants within seven days of the date of the submission of the tenant's name
to the association.
Nothing in this act shall grant a tenant any additional rights or protected
status under the laws applicable to eviction from rental premises.
2. This act shall take effect immediately.
N.J. REV. STAT. § 336 (1998).
This measure alleviates most, if not all, of the problems mentioned in the text
of this article at notes 47 to 53. It also solves another serious problem, that of the
threat to potential cooperators' ability to secure bank financing for acquisition of
their stock and leases. Most lending institutions will not take a mortgage on-prop-
erty (including coop leases and shares), unless they are certain they can re-sell the
same to FNMA. However, the FNMA guidelines for purchasing such loans from
banks indicates that the agency will not purchase coop share loans (mortgages) in a
building wherein less than eighty percent of the apartments are owner-occupied. See
FANNIEMAE, PROJECT STANDARDS, ch. 5, at 845-47 (1990). The recent New Jersey
legislation quoted above enables a coop board of directors to guarantee compliance
with the requirements of FNMA, by maintaining a wait list of cooperators who wish
to sublet their apartments and allowing no more than 20 percent of the cooperators
to sublet at any one time. A question may arise as to whether the holders of "unsold
shares" must get on such a wait list or are free to do as they please with regard to
subletting. Absent extenuating circumstances, it is the writer's view that all share-
holders should have to abide by this wait list procedure. The practicing bar is be-
coming increasingly aware of these problems and are advising their clients not to
purchase an apartment in a co-op building that may violate the eighty percent
owner-occupancy rule of FNMAL See generally, Jay Romano, Red Flags in a Co-op's
Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1999 (Real Estate), at 5.
It should be noted that there are seldom any suits involving alleged discrimi-
nation by condominium boards on re-sale matters, because of the dynamics of the
"match offer" device. The "wait list," if properly maintained and operated, should
not alter this situation. The one fly in the ointment may be the broker's loss of
commissions when a direct sale is made from the wait list without the intervention
of a broker. Managing agents of cooperatives, for example, typically manage for a
nominal sum and rely on the brokerage profits they will make on the re-sale of units
in the building. However, in recent years, managing agents have not been realizing
all of their resale brokerage opportunities as departing cooperators or condominium
unit owners either try to sell their apartments on their own or employ brokers not
affiliated with the managing agent's firm.
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list of pre-approved prospective purchasers. This mechanism
should be well received because it would save the seller the six
percent brokerage commission normally due a real estate agent
upon transfer.
B. The Nixon Case
There has always been a good deal of confusion surrounding
the celebrated case in which former President Richard Nixon
was prevented from purchasing an apartment in a luxury high-
rise building on Fifth Avenue in New York City.' Because in the
end the board of managers did not have to pay to keep President
Nixon from acquiring the unit in question, it is often mistakenly
described as a case involving the life-and-death control that co-
operative housing projects have over their constituent stockhold-
ers' right to re-sell their apartments. However, the Nixon case
actually arose under New York's condominium statute.55 Accord-
ingly, all the board of managers had to work with was the cus-
tomary "match offer" provision. Thus, if they wanted to keep the
former president out of the building, their only recourse was to
match the contract offer that had been made by Mr. Nixon to the
' Because 817 Fifth Avenue Condominium v. Nixon never went to trial and the
Judge at Special Term never had to act on our request to enjoin the sale, there is no
formal citation for the case. However, the major newspapers did track the progress
of the litigation, as brief as it was. Thus, for example, the Washington Post reported
that:
Residents of a luxury building at 817 Fifth Avenue in New York sued yes-
terday to block former president Richard Nixon and his wife from buying a
7th-floor condominium, saying the presence of the Secret Service would
disrupt their quiet lives.
The lawsuit, filed in state Supreme Court in Manhattan, asks that the
Nixons be prevented from buying the 12-room apartment unless they get
rid of the Secret Service agents assigned to the former president. Or, as an
alternative, the lawsuit said, the Nixons could agree to guidelines set forth
by the other residents to restrict Secret Service activities.
Justice Charles Tierney scheduled a hearing for tomorrow at which time
the Nixons must show cause why they should not by prevented from pur-
chasing the apartment.
In August Nixon withdrew a $750,000 offer for a nine-room duplex pent-
house on Madison Avenue at 72nd Street after residents of the 16-story co-
operative voiced opposition.
Personalities: The Nixons and the Neighbors, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 1979, at B2; see
also Robert McG. Thomas Jr., Nixons Reported to have Bought East Side House,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1979, at B1 (reporting that Nixon had "given up" on purchasing
the apartment and had likely forfeited most of the $92,500 deposit in a settlement
with Hirschfeld).
r" See supra text accompanying note 49.
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unit seller, one Abe Hirschfeld." However, this writer had only
recently converted the building from a rental property into a
condominium. In the depths of the 1974 real estate depression,
we had arranged for four tenants who challenged the validity of
the conversion plan to withdraw their objections and purchase
their units for the surprisingly low figure of $400,000 each. This
compromise enabled the conversion plan to be completed. Ap-
proximately one year later, Mr. Hirschfeld, one of the four pur-
chasers contracted to re-sell his unit to President Nixon for ap-
proximately one million dollars.57 When news of the pending sale
was reported in the press, the board and the other unit owners
were bombarded with threatening correspondence and bomb
threats.
58
The Nixon sale had to be stopped. However, if the board ex-
ercised its match offer rights, it would have to pay as much as
one million dollars for an apartment that sold for only $400,000
one year before. Consequently, we brought an order to show
cause to enjoin the sale on the theory that Mr. Nixon was dis-
qualified as a matter of law from buying into the building: By
having ten armed secret service people patrolling the halls,
stairs, elevators, lobby, roof, and basement of the premises, the
Nixons would immediately breach the condominium's by-laws
and house rules. We decided to proceed by way of an order to
show cause to enjoin the closing, because once the closing took
place, there was a risk that the law of federal marshals would
pre-empt New York's condominium statute and the project's
documentation. In order to ease the presiding judge's mind
about the board's motivation for excluding Mr. Nixon, we stated
in open court that we would waive all objections if Mr. Nixon
would waive secret service protection. His attorneys declined
this offer, calling it a Hobson's choice. The court then granted a
temporary restraining order and scheduled the next court date
for two weeks later. Fortunately, President Nixon decided to buy
5 See Robert D. McFadden, Nixon Agrees to Buy Apartment on 5th Avenue From
Hirschfelds, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1979, at 1 ("The agreement is not subject to the
approval of a board of tenants, as in a cooperative building, but state law allows a
condominiums' board of managers the right to block a sale by matching any pro-
spective tenant's offer."). The Times reported that "sources close to the negotiations
said it was very unlikely that the board would block Mr. Nixon's purchase." Id.57 See id.
See id.
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a free-standing town house instead. 9 This strategy proved to be
somewhat costly: it was rumored that Mr. Hirschfeld's counsel,
Scott Mollen, Esq., a former student of mine, forfeited most of
Mr. Nixon's ten percent down payment of approximately
$100,000.00.0
Curiously, Mr. Nixon could have avoided this entire problem
if his attorneys had only read the condominium documents. As
is usually the case, the documents provided that a unit owner
does not need any approval-and the board of managers does not
have any "match offer" right-if the sale or gift is between mem-
bers of one's immediate family. Thus, if the original contract of
sale had entered into by one of Mr. Nixon's daughters, she could
have subsequently given or sold the apartment to Mr. Nixon, and
the board would have been powerless to intervene. In any event,
Mr. Hirschfeld reaped additional rewards immediately after the
Nixon litigation by re-selling his apartment to a foreign busi-
nessman, this time for 1.1 million dollars. The board of manag-
ers elected not to exercise its match offer right and allowed that
sale to proceed."
"' See Thomas, supra note 54, at B1.
60 See id.
61 In what was to be the last reference to the 817 Fifth Avenue Condominium v.
Nixon case, cartoonist Hy Rosen published the following cartoon* in the October 5,
1979 issue of the Albany Times Union:
Ar MLY- Ffiday. oftou 5 1g79
"W WONT HAVE FiQA 1P NNON TO KICK AMoiNP AMOV
*Reprinted with the permission of the Albany Times Union.
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V. THE INSURANCE LAWS GOVERNING COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS
NEED TO BE STRENGTHENED TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE COVERAGE
AND TO EXPEDITE SETTLEMENTS
Because of the hybrid nature of a condominium unit owner's
interest, that is, separate ownership of the apartment, coupled
with an undivided percentage interest in the common elements,
complex casualty insurance questions are certain to arise.62
Other aspects of the condominium statutes were predestined to
generate legal complications, insofar as most of these measures
obligated the condominium's board of managers to insure the
entire project, typically in an amount equal to full replacement
cost, while at the same time stipulating that the purchase of
such a master policy was "without prejudice" to an individual's
right to purchase his own insurance.! This vague statutory
provision set the stage for lawsuits on such issues as whether
windows and doors were common elements for which the master
policy carrier was primarily (if not solely) responsible, or
whether they were part of each individual unit, and, therefore,
the sole responsibility of the unit owner's insurance carrier.'
Finally, and most significantly, the condominium statutes man-
date that unit owners continue to pay their monthly common
charges to the condominium association (as well as their mort-
gage payments and real estate taxes), even while out of posses-
sion because of a casualty loss they did not cause.' This is in
After losing the presidential election of 1960 to then-Senator John F. Kennedy,
Mr. Nixon went back to California to regroup. See DAVID ABRAHAMSEN, NIXON VS.
NIXON: AN EMOTIONAL TRAGEDY 176-77 (1977). Unfortunately, he lost his next run
for office in 1962 when he was defeated in his bid to become governor of California.
See id. Disillusioned, he told the press corps that he was leaving politics and moving
to New York. See id. Accordingly, they" 'won't have Richard Nixon to kick around
anymore.' "Id.
See generally Patrick J. Rohan, Disruption of the Condominium Venture: The
Problems of Casualty Loss and Insurance, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1045, 1047 (1964)
(discussing "the difficulties inherent in the very nature of the condominium concept
and those attributable to improper drafting or peculiarities of the law of insurance").
63 See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-bb (McKinney 1964) (amended 1984)
(deleting the "without prejudice" proviso); see also Rohan, supra note 62.
cSimilar problems occur when unit owners, with the approval of the board of
managers, make extensive improvements to their units without informing their in-
surance carriers. Thus, an insurer seeking to avoid some liability at a later date
may once again play the unit-versus-common elements shell game.
Condominium unit owners can guard against this economic double burden by
acquiring their own unit casualty policy, with a rider that covers the cost of interim
shelter. However, there are limits to the amount carriers will pay for such interim
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sharp contrast to the usual rule in the landlord-tenant area and
in the field of cooperative housing, wherein rental payments
abate while the tenant is out of possession because of a casualty
loss that he or she did not cause." The result is that the condo-
minium boards of managers's delay in restoring units that have
been seriously damaged by fire, flood or other catastrophe may
inflict both emotional and financial hardship on the dispossessed
unit owner.
67
In some cases the board's indifference to the plight of unit
owners who are forced out of their homes may be traceable, in
whole or in part, to the intransigence of insurers in settling
casualty loss claims. The combination of a board's indifference
and a carrier's intransigence caused an eleven-year delay in a re-
cent case that ultimately led to a settlement rumored to be in the
half-million dollar range, after years of litigation at the trial
court and appellate levels.68 This would not have occurred if the
applicable condominium or insurance statutes had a provision
enabling the court to sanction the carrier and/or the board of
managers for unreasonable delay in resolving the loss amount
and restoration of the building.
69
Additionally, certain commonly used carrier practices should
shelter. There is also a limit to the amount of time a family could reasonably be ex-
pected to tolerate being cramped into a motel room.
See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 227 (McKinney 1989). Standardized apart-
ment leases and proprietary leases frequently provide that the tenant's rental obli-
gation is forgiven for the period the premises are rendered uninhabitable. The
landlord and co-op corporation typically cover losses of rent and maintenance
charges by purchasing "loss of rental income" insurance.
See, e.g., Collins v. Hayden on the Hudson Condominium, 637 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52
(App. Div. 1996) (involving 8 years of litigation, 3 appeals and 4 applications for in-
terim relief in a case involving fire damage to common elements); see also Collins v.
Hayden on the Hudson Condominium, 602 N.Y.S.2d 867 (App. Div. 1993); Collins v.
Hayden on the Hudson Condominium, 580 N.Y.S.2d 355 (App. Div. 1992). But see
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 339-cc(2) (McKinney 1989) ("[Any damage to or destruction
of the building shall be promptly repaired and reconstructed by the board of manag-
ers."). Insurers are constantly litigating casualty insurance losses with condos and
their individual unit owners. See, e.g., Board of Managers v. Federal Ins. Co., 669
N.Y.S.2d 332 (App. Div. 1998); Collins v. Hayden on Hudson Condominium, 637
N.Y.S.2d 51 (App. Div. 1996); Collins, 580 N.Y.S.2d 355; Schiller v. Community
Tech., Inc., 433 N.Y.S.2d 640 (App. Div. 1980); Wiener v. State Farm Fire & Casu-
alty Co., N.Y. L.J. June 17, 1998, at 31 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. June 16, 1998).
See Collins, 637 N.Y.S.2d at 52.
r' See generally CLIFFORD J. TREESE & KATHERINE ROSENBERRY, COMMUNITY




be scrutinized and either curtailed or eliminated. For example,
it is common for a builder, within the guidelines of the local
building code, to place wall-to-wall carpeting over plywood floors
and treat them as finished floors. It is also customary for build-
ers to supply lighting fixtures, kitchen counters, and cabinets,
dishwashers, stoves, and refrigerators, as well as all customary
bathroom fixtures, as part of the new home being sold to the
public. At the same time, however, pursuant to the condomin-
ium's by-laws, the unit purchaser is responsible for replacing
these items if they are later damaged or worn out with the pas-
sage of time." The latter provision makes sense between the
unit owner and the condominium association.7' However, the
condominium's master casualty policy premiums are paid out of
the unit owner's monthly assessments, and provide for full re-
placement coverage of the units. Nevertheless, it is not uncom-
mon for insurance company adjusters to point to the above-
described by-law provisions and tell the owners of damaged units
that they, not the carrier, are responsible for replacing these
items. The lay person may be baffled by such assertions and get
short-changed by the master policy carrier. This practice by ad-
justers is all the more reprehensible because insurance carriers
generally reap additional profits on condominium unit policies,
and on projects which consist of multiple buildings or clusters,
where the risk of fire spreading is minimized. The growing
number of casualty-related cases, as well as growing legal litera-
ture in this field, attest to the existence of these insurance prob-
lems and require that these matters be dealt with promptly.72 In
70 Cf. Richard Siegler, Agreements for Apartment Alterations, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 4,
1998, at 3 (stating that an unknowing unit purchaser may be held responsible for
fixing alterations made to the apartment by a previous owner).
' The average lay person will read such a clause as requiring the unit owner to
replace or repair carpeting and appliances that have been worn out over time or
damaged by the abuse of family members. However, the average lay person would
not imagine that the same provision would enable an insurer to avoid responsibility
for these items if they were destroyed or damaged in connection with a major casu-
alty loss.
Where a condominium unit owner combines units or makes substantial im-
provements to a unit, it is advisable for such unit owner to comply with building de-
partment and internal condominium documents requirements. It is also advisable
that details of the changes being made be transmitted to the appropriate insurance
carrier(s).
7See, e.g., Weiner, N.Y. L.J., June 17, 1998, at 32; Federal Fire Ins. Co., 669
N.Y.S.2d 332; cf. Bernard v. Scharf, 656 N.Y.S.2d 583 (App. Div. 1997) (ordering the
owners of cooperative apartment building to restore fire-damaged building), rev'd on
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addition to the remedies already suggested above, these disputes
might be quickly settled, perhaps at the unit owner's option, by
an ombudsman or an arbitrator in order to foster a just settle-
ment and to prompt restoration of affected units or buildings.
VI. IN LIGHT OF THE LONG LIFE PROJECTED FOR COMMUNITY
ASSOCIATIONS, CONSIDERATION MUST BE GIVEN TO STATUTORY
PROVISIONS GUARANTEEING THE VALIDITY OF PROJECT
DOCUMENTATION (THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES AND
RELATED COMMON LAw DOCTRINES NOTWITHSTANDING)
In many of the early home owner association arrangements,
it was common to provide that recorded covenants and restric-
tions pertaining to the powers to collect assessments and man-
age the facilities would expire on a specified date (typically thirty
to forty years in the future).7" Similarly, the proprietary lease
typically issued along with shares in the cooperative apartment
corporation in New York generally was designed to expire on a
certain date, usually around the fortieth anniversary of its issu-
ance. Counsel for such projects no doubt thought that forty
years was an eternity and hence provided no mechanism to cover
the likely contingency that the constituent owners might elect to
continue the co-op or H.O.A. far beyond its initial specified expi-
ration date.74 This has led to a number of lawsuits questioning
the validity of the H.O.A.'s activities, especially the collection of
assessments after the expiration date of the original docu-
ments.75
other grounds, 675 N.Y.S.2d 64 (App. Div. 1998) (finding that the order to restore
violated the takings clause), rev'd sub nom. In re Bernard, No. 01599 (N.Y. Feb. 23,
1999) (dismissing proceedings on mootness grounds)
" See, e.g., Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Indus. Say. Bank, 15
N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1938) (enforcing covenants set to expire after 29 years).
' See generally Richard Siegler, Proprietary Lease Modifications, N.Y. L.J., July
13, 1990, at 3 (stating that original proprietary leases need to be re-examined and
re-written to take into account changing needs and circumstances of owners).
75 See, e.g., White v. Lewis, 487 S.W.2d 615, 616 (Ark. 1972) (finding that "in
toto ... the restriction and the provisions for waiver [were] unambiguous" and
called for automatic extension periods for the covenants); La Jolla Mesa Vista Im-
provement Ass'n v. La Jolla Mesa Vista Homeowners Ass'n, 220 Cal. Rptr. 825, 829
(App. Ct. 1990) ("In our view the benefits to be derived from renewal of the CC & Rs
coupled with the benefits gained from a procedure which resolves the renewal issue
with certainty and finality are sufficient consideration to support the irrevocability
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Because all initial sales of co-op apartments must be made
pursuant to an offering plan accepted for filing by the New York
State Attorney General's Office, one might logically assume that
a new offering plan or some other involvement of the Attorney
General's Office would be necessary to revise and extend proprie-
tary leases about to expire. In the one reported case on point,
however, the court held that a bare majority could amend and
extend the proprietary lease and that the Attorney General's Of-
fice need not get involved in the process.76 Definitive guidance is
required, therefore, in terms of drafting original project docu-
ments as well as applicable statutes. At the same time, the leg-
islature should curtail or eliminate the possible application of
the "Rule against Perpetuities" and other common-law doctrines
concerning indirect restraints upon alienation as they relate to
community association documentation.77
of the consents obtained by [the defendants]."); Boyles v. Hausman, 509 N.W.2d 676,
679 (Neb. Ct. App. 1993) (holding language in an agreement to mean that the cove-
nants were binding for five years, after which they could be changed by a majority
vote of the property owners); Brandwein v. Serrano, 338 N.Y.S.2d 192, 197 (Sup. Ct.
1972) (finding the lack of assent of some property owners prevented an "Extension
Agreement" from "ever attaining validity as a binding restriction"); Anderson v.
Lake Arrowhead Civic Ass'n, 483 S.E.2d 209 (Va. 1997) (reading the expiration date
of covenants literally and refusing to permit them to be revived).
76 See Sherry Assocs. v. Sherry-Netherland, Inc., N.Y. L.J., June 13, 1996, at 30
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996), affd, 657 N.Y.S.2d 549 (App. Div. 1997) (mem.). The unfortu-
nate result in the Sherry case permitted one block of stockholders who resided in
the hotel to jeopardize the rights of a second group that purchased rooms in the ho-
tel co-op as an investment. The net effect was to override a stockholders' agreement
which set up a formula for allocating hotel-type expenses by finding that the for-
mula did not have to be carried over into the new proprietary lease that had been
approved by a simple majority. For a discussion of the principles generally govern-
ing amendment of co-op documents, see Brennan v. Breezy Point Cooperative, Inc.,
473 N.E.2d 738 (N.Y. 1984).
7 A number of decisions handed down within the past fifteen years, culminating
in Symphony Space, Inc. v. Pergola Properties, Inc., 669 N.E.2d 799 (N.Y. 1996), in-
dicate that the provision of New York's perpetuity statute apply to options. In Sym-
phony Space, the Court of Appeals expressly ruled that:
(1) The New York statutory rule against perpetuities invalidated commercial
options that might involve remoteness of vesting,
(2) Options to purchase that form an integral part of a lease may be sustained;
(3) "Match offer" provisions, such as those found in various condominium stat-
utes and documents, should be looked upon more favorably, at least where they
leave the decision whether to sell or not to the party subject to the "match offer"
proviso, and also contain a fair formula for eventually determining the price to be
paid for the property-,
(4) Courts will not strain to save options by liberal construction or by assuming
that they will be exercised, if at all, within twenty-one years from the date they
were created; and
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VII. REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE MARKETING AND OPERATION
OF RETIREMENT COMMUNITIES MUST BE STRENGTHENED,
ESPECIALLY WHERE LARGE ENTRY FEES ARE EXACTED FROM THE
PARTICIPANTS
In recent years the "old age home" has been replaced by re-
tirement projects for senior citizens that are still active in sports
and related activities.78 In addition to the exercise facilities,
marketing campaigns for these projects emphasize the benefits
of self-sustained living in one's own apartment or condominium,
and highlight services ranging from emergency health-care fa-
cilities, assisted-living arrangements, and on-site skilled nurs-
ing-home type facilities.79 In many jurisdictions this niche of the
housing market has escaped government notice and regulation.
Moreover, in a number of projects, a six-figure entrance fee is
charged.8" Although representations are often made that these
fees are to be refunded when the payor leaves the project, the
funds may not be there, in whole or in part, when the refund is
requested. This situation arises because there may be neither
applicable trust fund provisions nor restrictions on what the de-
(5) Parties disappointed by an unanticipated application of the foregoing rules
to their transactions may not be entitled to either rescission or a partial repayment
of their consideration, because the granting of these remedies might be equated
with the enforcement of the invalid provision.
The foregoing discussion would suggest that a person drafting covenants run-
ning with the land that involve affirmative burdens, options to purchase property in
a commercial or non-commercial setting, or pre-emptive rights such as match-offer
rights in a private or commercial setting, must seriously consider adding an express
"perpetuity cut-off" provision, to enhance the chance of success in later litigation.
The same advice might apply to the drafting of options to purchase found in leases,
although such provisions are viewed more kindly by the courts.
In this connection, it is significant to note that a great many condominium
statutes expressly stipulate that a "match offer" provision that favors the associa-
tion does not violate the jurisdictions "Rule Against Perpetuities." There is no rea-
son why this type of legislative fiat could not be applied to the longevity of commu-
nity associations.
78 See, e.g., Glenn Ruffenach, So Long, Bingo: Forget the Old Image of Retire-
ment Communities, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 1998, at R6 (reporting on retirement com-
munities "selling new 'ifestyles' to retirees"); Kathy McCabe, Peabody is Thinking
Big with 1,300-Unit Retirement Community Brooksby Village, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct.
4, 1998, at 12 (reporting on "the single largest development project ever planned for
Peabody[, Massachusetts]").
79 The litany of financial risks associated with these various retirement pro-
grams is vividly depicted in Moss, supra note 19, at Al.
8See, e.g., Emi Endo, Senior Housing Awaits Approval, NEWSDAY, Nov. 8, 1998,
at G21; McCabe, supra note 78.
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veloper can do with the money in the interim.81 Analogous prob-
lems arise in projects where the large fee exacted of newcomers
is not refundable but is supposed to enable the operator to lower
the monthly maintenance charges by providing the latter with
supplemental income, such as interest earned on the six-figure
entrance fee.82 Participants' financial risks may be further
complicated by the uncertainties and periodic changes made in
Medicare and similar state and federally funded programs as
well as regulations governing Health Maintenance Organiza-
tions. Several of the projects described above have gone into
bankruptcy or are tottering on the brink of insolvency.' While
the issues raised by this type of living are primarily health and
longevity related, there are also real estate implications. Accord-
ingly, it may be time for federal and state agencies concerned
with senior citizen issues to oversee and regulate such entities,
at least with respect to truth in advertising and the safety of
participants' up-front cash investments.
VIII. MANY STATUTES AND REGULATIONS DESIGNED TO PROTECT
THE PUBLIC AT LARGE, OR TENANTS IN PARTICULAR, ARE BEING
APPLIED TO COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION BOARDS OR CONSTITUENT
UNIT OWNERS. IF THIS TREND IS NOT CAREFULLY MONITORED, IT
MAY WELL CRIPPLE COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION PROJECTS.
Perhaps the largest single threat to community association
living (whether in the form of a co-op, condominium, or H.O.A.),
may be the courts' power to impose civil and criminal penalties
on community associations, even when one or a small number of
association board members or employees may be responsible for
the harm complained of.' Such an occurrence has the potential
to bankrupt associations and their unsuspecting constituent
8' See generally Michael D. Floyd, Should Government Regulate the Financial
Management of Continuing Care Retirement Communities? 1 ELDER L.J. 29 (1993)
(proposing regulation of continuing care retirement facilities to protect consumers
against mismanagement and fraud).
2 See id. at 45.
8 See Moss, supra note 19, at Al (outlining the hidden economic perils that
await retirees who buy into such arrangements without thoroughly investigating
the risks involved). Moss traces the steps leading up to the collapse of several well-
known and highly regarded senior citizen projects, including some affiliated with
religous or other non-profit sponsors. See id.
See Richard Siegler, The Liability of Board Members, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 7, 1998,
at 3; Richard Siegler, Director, Officer Liability Insurance, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 6, 1993, at
1999]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [73:3
owners. This danger is magnified when the association's liability
policy does not cover the action or inaction giving rise to the liti-
gant's complaint.85 One example would be a suit generated by a
prospective member who claims that he or she was excluded
from the project for reasons relating to race, creed, color, relig-
ion, or some similar suspect criterion.88 Such prohibited dis-
crimination is regarded as an intentional tort, and liability aris-
8' See, e.g., 2A PATRICK J. RoHAN & MELVIN A. RESKIN, COOPERATIVE HOUSING:
LAW AND PRACTICE § 8.02 (1998) (stating that a judgment involving a matter not
covered by liability insurance will force the association to make up the difference);
see also Richard Siegler, Troublesome By-Law Provisions, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 18, 1991,
at3. Regarding whether coop director can get indemnity and/or insurance coverage
for illegal discrimination see Biondi v. Beekman Hill House Apartment Corp., N.Y.
L.J. Aug. 26, 1998, at 22 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 25, 1998). See generally John M. Payne,
From the Courts: The Condominium As Landlord-Determining Tort Liability, 15
REAL EST. L.J. 365 (1987).
For a unique statute exonerating directors of cooperatives, condominiums and
Home Owners Associations under certain defined circumstances see Maryland Real
Prop. Code section 14-118 which stipulates as follows:
(a) "Governing body" defined.--(1) In this section "governing body" means a
person who has the authority to enforce:
(i) The provisions of a declaration, as defined under § 11-103 of the
Maryland Condominium Act;
(ii) Articles of incorporation of a council of unit owners, of a cooperative
housing corporation..., or of a homeowners association... ; or
(iii) The provisions of bylaws, rules, and regulations of a condomin-
ium .... of a cooperative housing corporation..., or of a homeowners as-
sociation ....
(2) Governing body includes:
(i) A homeowners association;
(ii) A council of unit owners of a condominium ....
(iii) A cooperative housing corporation ....
(b) Actions against governing body for actual damages.-A person sustain-
ing an injury as a result of the tortious act of an officer or director of a gov-
erning body while the officer or director is acting within the scope of the
officer's of director's duties may recover only in an action brought against
the governing body [for the actual damages sustained].
(c) Personal liability of directors or officers prohibited.-In a proceeding
against a governing body, a director or officer of a governing body may not
be held personally liable for injuries sustained by a party if the director or
officer [(1) acted within the scope of his or her duties; (2) acted in good
faith; and (3) did not act in a reckless, wanton, or grossly negligent man-
ner].
MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 14-118 (Supp. 1997). See generally 2A ROHAN &
RESKIN, supra note 85, § 8.02.
' See 2A ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 85, § 8.02 (1998). On the nature and type
of lawsuits brought by unit owners and their guests on common law negligence
grounds (including suits brought because of criminal actions by intruders) see id.
§ 8.02 n.7.
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ing out of such discrimination is usually not covered by officers'
and directors' liability insurance.87
A few examples will serve to illustrate the growing menace
to community association living presented by such exposure. Re-
cently, in People v. Premier House, Inc.,' an inspection of a
building managed by a professional managing agent revealed
that the premises did not have window guards designed to pro-
tect small children from falling to the concrete sidewalk below,
constituting both civil and criminal offenses under local law.8"
The district attorney's office actively pursued an indictment
against the officers and directors of the cooperative housing cor-
poration.90 However, none of these individuals were experienced
in such matters and relied upon the expertise of the building's
managing agent for compliance with all applicable laws.9' While
not conceding that its original position on the matter was incor-
rect or inappropriate, the district attorney's office later relented
and agreed to pursue the co-op corporation and perhaps the
managing agent and not to indict the co-op's officers and direc-
tors.92
More recently, the Supreme Court of New York County re-
fused to grant summary judgment to several cooperative housing
corporations that had been sued for discrimination.9 The defen-
dants, all cooperative corporations, employed the same profes-
sional managing agent.' The plaintiff, a female, applied to the
managing agent for a position as a doorman, but was allegedly
turned down because the managing agent engaged in sexual and
racial discrimination." Although it appeared that the profes-
sional managing agent acted on its own in the matter, the court
opined that the thirteen cooperative corporations may have been
aware of the discriminatory practices and might thus be liable to
8 See ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 85, § 12.02[2] [f].
662 N.Y.S.2d 1006, 1008 (Crim. Ct. 1997).
89 See id. at 1008.
o See id.
91 See id, at 1009.
See id. at 1008. If prospective members are not frightened out of serving on
the board of a community association by the thought of exaggerated negligence li-
ability, they may certainly think twice before exposing themselves to criminal liabil-
ity, such as for fraud.
See Hill v. Douglas Elliman Gibbons & Ives, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 16, 1998, at 28
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the plaintiff.6
A similar result was reached in Sanders v. Winship.97 In
Sanders, a cooperative housing board rejected a proposed re-sale
of an apartment to a Jewish couple.9" After the prospective pur-
chasers left their interview session with the co-op board, the wife
of the co-op board's president was heard making an anti-Semitic
remark.99 The New York Court of Appeals relied, in part, on the
wife's remark in finding a prima facie case of religious discrimi-
nation, even though the person making the remark had no offi-
cial title or position with the housing cooperative.'00
An even greater extension of community association liability
was sought in Reeves v. Carrollsburg Condominium Unit Ass'n, O1
involving a Washington, D.C. condominium. In Reeves, one con-
dominium unit owner harassed another and openly engaged in
racially discriminatory comments and conduct.0 2 The unit owner
complaining of the discriminatory treatment, a long-time resi-
dent and former president of the condominium, sued the asso-
ciation on the theory that the group should have done more-
including going to court to stop the offending unit owner from
harassing her.03 She alleged that the wrongdoer shouted racial
and sexual slurs at her, wrote her threatening notes and made
her feel generally unsafe in the condominium complex on several
occasions!" 4 Further, the alleged perpetrator had recently pled
guilty in a criminal case based on the same charges and was
facing a year's probation.' The condominium's board of manag-
ers ultimately settled out of court, reportedly agreeing to pur-
chase the plaintiffs unit and pay her $550,000.00 in compensa-
tion. 6 The suit and the alleged settlement have both drawn
negative comments from the Community Association's Institute,
96 See id.
97 442 N.E.2d 1231 (N.Y. 1982).
98 See id. at 1233.
9 See id.
'00 See id. at 1233-35 (finding that the defendant, Mrs. Winship, was a coopera-
tive tenant and "could be found to have been a participating or contributing cause of
the withholding of consent").
1'0 No. 96-2495RMU, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21762 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 18, 1997).
'02 See id. at *4; see also Bill Miller, D.C. Condo Owners to Pay for Members Ra-
cial Insults, WASH. POST, June 10, 1998, at A01.






a non-profit housing group."7
The area of racial discrimination is not the only loose cannon
community associations have to contend with.0 " On the horizon
are suits based on age discrimination;' 9 sexual harassment;1.
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act;"' toxic torts
(stemming from lead paint or asbestos contamination in older
buildings);" criminal conduct of intruders;"' failure to comply
'07 The press release issued by the Community Association's Institute on June
11, 1998, stated in pertinent part:
"It's widely known that community associations have broad powers of en-
forcement for covenants included in association documents. But Carrolls-
burg Condominium was literally hamstrung in its efforts to put a stop to
Air. Schongalla's unacceptable behavior," said Robert M. Diamond, past
president of CAI and attorney with Hazel and Thomas, P.C., Falls Church.
Diamond represented Carrollsburg a number of years ago when Reeves
was on the association board. "Community associations are ill-equipped to
force out a homeowner for discrimination and usually are not empowered
to purchase an owner's home for that purpose."
"It's ironic that the same people that criticize community associations
from failing to protect one owner from the actions of another protest when
the association reasonably enforces its architectural restrictions," Diamond
said. "The primary vehicle for the enforcement of public laws must be local
government and the police. Community associations simply do not have the
resources."
"These developments highlight the maturing of community associations
and raise new questions about the role community associations will play in
society," Diamond said. "We're progressing from disputes over paint colors
and treehouses to issues that test the boundaries of community association
governance, from dealing with discrimination to efforts to ban "Tier 3" Me-
en's Law sex offenders from living in associations."
See Reeves, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21762, at *16 (concluding that the hostile
housing environment test applies to claims of racial and sexual harassment).
'0" See, e.g., Huntington Landmark Adult Community Ass'n v. Ross, 261 Cal.
Rptr. 875 (1989); Sunrise Country Club Ass'n, v. Proud, 235 Cal. Rptr. 404 (Ct. App.
1987).
1 0 See, e.g., Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926
(2d Cir. 1988), affd 488 U.S. 15 (1988); Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983
(4th Cir. 1984); Beliveau v. Caras, 873 F. Supp. 1393 (C.D. Cal. 1995); New York ex
rel. Abrams v. Merlino, 694 F. Supp. 1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
"' See, e.g., Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apartments, 136 F.3d 293, 299
(2d Cir. 1998) (stating that "Ithe Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (IAA')
extended the Fair Housing Act's principle of equal opportunity in housing to indi-
viduals with handicaps"); see also Bronk v. Ineichen, 54 F.3d 425, 429 (7th Cir.
1995) (finding that a landlord must make reasonable accommodations to a disabled
tenant and allow a deaf tenant's hearing dog on the premises, in spite of the land-
lord's no-pet policy).
112 See generally Cottle v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 882 (Ct. App. 1992)
(finding that the plaintiffs could not introduce evidence of physical injuries allegedly
caused by toxic chemicals where they could not establish probable causation).
113 See Frances T. v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 723 P.2d 573, 576-79 (Cal.
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with "Megan's Law,""4 and a myriad of other grounds for the im-
position of civil and criminal penalties and/or punitive dam-
ages."' The legal costs of defending these types of litigation may
jeopardize the solvency of smaller community associations. Re-
gardless of the size of the association, bad publicity surrounding
these suits will undoubtedly cause many qualified candidates to
refuse to serve on their community's boards."6 If the avalanche
of suits and the attendant adverse publicity are not curtailed
soon, real estate practitioners may begin to recommend extreme
counter measures, such as taking title to one's unit in a corpo-
rate name or advising purchasers not to buy housing that in-
volves a community association.
1 7
1986) (in bank) (concluding that condominium associations have the same duty of
care that landlords have to tenants and thus can be held liable).
114 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1-11 (West Supp. 1998).
1 See Brown v. Christopher St. Owners Corp., 663 N.E.2d 1251 (N.Y. 1996)
(affirming order dismissing complaint against tenant made by window washer who
fell); White v. Cox, 95 Cal. Rptr. 259 (Ct. App. 1971) (involving a trip-and-fall over a
water sprinkler); Goodrich v. Watermill Townhouses, Inc., 645 N.Y.S.2d 721 (Sup.
Ct. 1996) (concluding that a condominium home owner association did not need to
be the title holder of the condominium to be held liable for injuries sustained by an
independent contractor's employee who had been hired to maintain the grounds);
Moody v. Cawdrey Assocs., Inc., 721 P.2d 708 (Haw. App.) (involving assault of con-
dominium owners' guests by third parties), rev'd, 721 P.2d 707 (Haw. 1986) (per cu-
riam).
Another casualty of this liability explosion may be the professional property
manager, a hearty but shrinking breed of project managers. In the past, professional
property managers were seldom sued for any reason. In recent years, however, their
liability exposure has grown at an alarming rate. At the same time, their revenue
sources have diminished. Many managing agents work for a small monthly stipend
and rely on the profitable real estate brokerage commissions they earn when con-
stituent owners list their property for re-sale with their agency. However, this
source of income is shrinking fast, as departing owners circumvent the broker and
re-sell directly to the purchaser. See supra note 53.
116 See Miller, supra note 102 (discussing this defense, raised in the Reeves
case).
117 At least two justifications can be advanced for limiting the liability of com-
munity associations and their constituent owners. First, many statutes giving rise
to owner liability were drafted with business organizations or entrepreneur land-
lords in mind. They were enacted with a view that profit-making entities should be
held to a traditional negligence standard of care and are able to insure against these
risks and pass associated costs along to their customers. Second, there is a long his-
tory of exempting rental buildings with three or fewer families in them, so-called
"mom and pop" operations, from otherwise-applicable legislative mandates. The
modem-day counterpart of this protected class should be the constituent unit own-
ers in community associations. Furthermore, as asserted previously by other
authors, the community association operates, in effect, as a local government and its
decrees and actions should be immunized accordingly. See supra note 37 and ac-
companying text.
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CONCLUSION
The bulk of the early writing in this field, as well as the vast
majority of suits, involved building defects, disputes with devel-
opers and controlling the anti-social conduct of a few recalcitrant
owners. However, a new generation of problems looms on the
horizon which involves evils of far greater magnitude that may
not be remedied by mere improvements in project documenta-
tion. Most of the problems discussed can only be resolved with
new legislation or judicial determinations that override firmly-
established precedent. In order to safeguard the solvency of
community associations, a whole new set of legislative initiatives
or classifications may have to be implemented. At the same
time, associations, their boards and their constituent unit own-
ers must be advised of their potential liability and be warned
against the notion that they are free to violate public policy with
impunity.
In view of the myriad (and ever growing) sources of liability faced by constitu-
ent owners in all forms of community association arrangements, such individuals
would be well advised to purchase an "umbrella" liability policy (with rather hefty
liability limits). Consideration should also be given to legislation, as well as modern-
ized project documentation, that would limit the liability of each owner to a pro-rata
share of any judgment rendered against the community association (at least where
the individual had not been an active participant in the conduct that gave rise to the
liability in the first place). See generally Patricia H. Nunley, An Analysis of Premises
Liability of Property Owners in Texas for Third-Party Criminal Acts: An Accomplice
to the Crime or Another Victim?, 27 REAL EST. L.J. 118 (1998); Jerry C.M. Orten &
John H. Zacharia, Allocation of Damages for Tort Liability in Common Interest
Communities, 31 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 647 (1997); Payne, supra note 86;
Karen E. Klein, Condo Owners Liable for Common Area Mishaps, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
14, 1993, at K1, available in 1993 WL 2339887.
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APPENDIX
COVENANTS AND RESTRICTIONS CREATED AND RECORDED BY
HENRYE. INGRAM
The property described particularly in Exhibit "A", affixed
hereto, and known generally as "Delta Plantation," which was
conveyed on or about January 23, 1998 to Henry E. Ingram
(Purchaser) from Cullum's Lumber Mill, Inc. (Seller), (hereafter
"the Property"), shall be hereafter subject to the following cove-
nants and/or restrictions:
1. The property shall never be leased, sold, bequeathed, de-
vised or otherwise transferred, permanently or temporarily, to
any person or entity that may be described as being part of the
Yankee race. "Yankee" as used herein, shall mean any person or
entity born or formed north of the Mason-Dixon line, or any per-
son or entity who has lived or been located for a continuous pe-
riod of one (1) year above said line. In determining a "continuous
period" as used herein, intermittent periods of one week or less
shall not be construed as severing continuity;
2. No person with the last name of Sherman shall ever own,
lease, enter, occupy, walk upon, or hold any interest, of any na-
ture or kind in the Property. Any person born up North whose
last name may be spelled by using the letters found in the name
Sherman is subject to the same restrictions and covenants as if
his name were Sherman. No business entity with the name
Sherman in its name, trade name, or any previous business
name, shall ever acquire or maintain any interest in the Prop-
erty or provide any goods or services thereon.
3. Nothing contained herein shall be construed as active
discrimination against those Southern persons of African de-
scent. In fact, Southern persons of African descent shall not be
subject to, and are expressly excluded from, the restrictions and
covenants contained in paragraph two (2) above; provided that
all subsequent transferors shall be so subject, as will the initial
transfer of the Property from the Southern person of African de-
scent to the subsequent transferor. Southern persons of African
descent may be given permission upon written request to use,
hunt, fish and/or own the Property. Any Southern person of Af-
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rican descent is entitled to a ten percent (10%) discount if he or
she purchases the Property from Henry E. Ingram or his heirs
and/or assigns.
4. Any of the above restrictions, covenants and conditions
may be waived in writing by Henry E. Ingram, his heirs or as-
signs; provided that, in the event that the waiver is being
granted by a person other than Henry E. Ingram or his son Ster-
ling Ashley Ingram, the written waiver requires the written ap-
proval of at least one other person, related by blood to Henry E.
Ingram, who was born in a State of the Union located geographi-
cally at least 15 miles South of the State of Virginia.
5. The covenants and restrictions discussed above in Para-
graphs one (1) through four (4) are necessary to ensure that the
Yankees will never again own or control large tracts of land that
rightfully belong in Southern hands and under Southern domin-
ion. They are intended to prevent Yankee ownership of property
stolen or conscripted after the great war of Northern aggression
after 1865 by the Yankee Carpetbaggers and Scalawags.
6. Delta Plantation will once again be available to the true
Southerners to view, camp, hunt, fish, use, enjoy and share as
true Southerners are taught from birth. Thank you Sir.
7. No redwood lumber may be used by any person who
builds any wooden structure on the property. This restriction is
due in part to a certain large redwood tree in the Western
United States that is named after the late coward and war
criminal William T. Sherman. Additionally this restriction is
due in part to certain environmental views shared and held by
the authors to these restrictions.
8. These covenants and restrictions were drafted and exe-
cuted by a true Southerner, Henry E. Ingram, Jr., this 2nd day of
February in the year of our God, 1998.
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EXHIBITA
ALL those certain pieces, parcels or tracts of land situate,
lying and being in Jasper County, South Carolina, containing
1606.86 acres, more or less, and 63.02 acres, more or less, and
being a portion of Tract A and of the Poindexter Tract of the
Delta Plantation Tracts as shown and delineated on that certain
plat of survey prepared by Coastal Surveying Company, Inc.
dated July 1, 1975 for Chevron Oil Company, which Plat is re-
corded in Plat Book 18 at Page 60 in the Office of the Clerk of
Court for Jasper County, South Carolina. The 1606.86 acre tract
being shown and designated as Tract "A", and the 63.02 acre
tract being shown and designated as Tract "B" on that certain
plat of survey entitled "Plat of 1,674.88 acres, Portion of Delta
Plantation Surveyed for Henry Ingram", prepared by Paul D.
Wilder, R.L.S. of Wilder Surveying and Mapping, dated January
12, 1998 and recorded in the Office of the Clerk of Court for Jas-
per County, South Carolina in Plat Book 23 at Page 47. Said
Tract "A" being generally bounded and described as follows: on
the North by Tract "C" as shown on the aforesaid plat and by the
R/W of SC Hwy. 170 and by lands, now or formerly of Collum's
Lumber Mill, Inc.; on the Northeast by lands of John E. Cay, III;
on the East by the Centerline of the Old Screven Ferry Road and
a 30' access easement, and other lands of Collum's Lumber Mill,
Inc.; on the South by lands of the Georgia Department of Trans-
portation, and on the West by lands of Tench C. Coxe, III, lands
of Daniel E. Huger, and the eastern edge of the R/W of U.S.
Highway 17-A. Said Tract "B" being generally bounded and de-
scribed as follows; on the North by lands of Robert Minis; on the
East by the R/W of U.S. Hwy. 17-A; on the South by lands of
Carswell; on the Southwest by lands of Clydesdale Club, and on
the Northwest by lands of A. Minis, Jr. For a more particular
description, reference is hereby made to the aforesaid plat of rec-
ord.
TOGETHER with those certain easement rights appurte-
nant to the above described property reserved by Chevron Sta-
tions, Inc. in that certain Deed from Chevron Stations, Inc. to
Department of Transportation, State of Georgia, dated October
17, 1985 and recorded in Book 89, Page 168, in the records for
the Office of the Clerk of Court for Jasper County, South Caro-
lina and all rights of reversion and other rights to the roadbed of
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U.S. Highway 17-A retained pursuant to that certain Right of
Way Deed dated August 17, 1953 and recorded in Book 30, Page
39, in the Office of the Clerk of Court for Jasper County, South
Carolina.
EXCEPTING AND RESERVING UNTO CHEVRON
STATIONS, INC., ITS SUCCESSORS AND ASSIGNS, all rights
as delineated in that certain deed from Chevron Stations, Inc. to
Delta Plantation Corporation, dated June 25, 1987 and recorded
in Deed Book 91 at Page 1483 in the Office of the Clerk of Court
for Jasper County, South Carolina.
BEING the same property conveyed to Henry E. Ingram, Jr.
by Deed of Collum's Lumber Mill, Inc. dated January 23, 1998
and recorded January -, 1998 in Deed Book _ at Page
in the Office of the Clerk of Court for Jasper County, South
Carolina.
Jasper County Tax Map Reference: 037-00-02-002 (portion
of).
SOUTHERN OATH
Of my own free will and choice, I do hereby in the presence
of these witnesses swear to be loyal to the South. With the sole
exception of my immediate family, I hereto swear to never utter
any good words regarding the dastardly Yankee race even if by
some chance I observe some redeeming quality amongst their
steed. I will never mention the word Sherman unless it is to de-
scribe his cowardly and inhuman characteristics.
When speaking of Yankees, I will refer to them as scalawags
or carpetbaggers. I will love, honor and obey the true Southern
way of life by never saying anything disrespectful to my wife or
children.
I will now whistle or hum Dixie as a sign of my loyalty and
as a token of my new out-look on life.
I swear this oath on the grave of Robert E. Lee.
TIME 2:25 PM DATE 1/24/98
SOUTHERN WITNESSES: FULL NAME OF OATH
SWEARER:
I will swear Openly on
Videotape This Oath.
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA)
PROBATE
COUNTY OF BEAUFORT )
Personally appeared before me the undersigned witness
who, being duly sworn, deposed and said that (s)he saw the
within Henry E. Ingram, Jr. sign, seal and, as his act and deed,
deliver the foregoing Covenants and Restrictions and that (s)he,
together with the other witness whose name appears as a wit-
ness, witnessed the execution thereof.
HENRY E. INGRAM
SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED
BEFORE ME THIS 2ND DAY
OF FEBRUARY, 1998.
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR SOUTH CAROLINA
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 1/22/2003
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